Scholarly Contributions | Middle East and Africa

US POLICY APPROACHES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

A leading scholar of international relations and peace and conflict resolution, Professor Abdul Aziz Said did not shy away from also engaging policymaking circles. US government officials frequently sought his advice on issues in the Middle East and Africa (MEA) – particularly North Africa – even as Said intentionally did not define himself as a regional expert. In his policy analysis and advice, Said articulated a strong opposition to foreign imposition and Western-led, top-down approaches, calling out American hypocrisy and cultural triumphalism. Yet he also saw a clear role for US foreign policy to make a positive impact. Said advocated for a cooperative approach for US policymakers in the region that centered locally driven solutions and cultural pluralism, as well as the building of a “new story” of complementarity and coexistence between the US and MEA actors.

Even as a young scholar in the 1960s, Said did not hesitate to vocalize his criticism of US policy that supported the status quo of regional power dynamics and put short-term (at that time anti-communist) American interests ahead of longer-term stability, security, and peace.¹ As he later put it, the American response was “both uninspiring and ineffectual.”²

In a 1990 article titled “U.S. Middle East Policy: Outdated Premises in a New Strategic Context,” Said identified several developments that attest to the need for a bold shift in US policy, including the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear and chemical weapons in the region, the rapidly rising dependence on oil imports, and the first (nonviolent) Intifada that had “rescued the destiny of Palestinians from the trash heaps of Arab political manipulation.”³ Toward the end of the Cold War, Said urged the US to invite the Soviet Union into a peace partnership in the region, encouraging both powers to “offer incentives to Israelis, Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese grounded in an international legal framework” as well as calling for peace negotiations “based on the recognition of the legitimacy of the claims for all parties to the conflict, a moratorium on violence, and finally, an American-Soviet-sanctioned arms-free zone in the Middle East for the duration of peace negotiations.”⁴ Instead of “remaining focused singularly on the traditional idea of national security,” Said proposed a new approach for US policy in the region, encouraging a focus on reciprocal interests and a dynamic “security triangle” model that includes 1) social justice, 2) political participation, and 3) self-determination.⁵ Specifically, he advocated for a comprehensive, cooperative strategy “which integrates arms control with economic and political considerations, adds vigor to the ongoing Arab-Israeli peace process, and fosters greater social justice and political participation in the region.”⁶ Said saw an important role for the US in this strategy, but one that required balance and humility. He frequently wrote and advised on the threat of nuclear proliferation in the region, but called out the US for promoting arms control guidelines while “its own arms sales increased astronomically.”⁷ The US push for non-proliferation has been “so self-serving and one-sided as to lack credibility.”⁸ While Said was clear that the US has a unique role to play in encouraging weapons restraint, he also noted that it “will have little success in reducing proliferation unless it holds Israel to the same standards it applies to the Arab states.”⁹

Indeed, in a 1996 article with Professor Nathan Funk, Said explained that “many Muslims are sensitive to perceived double standards in US foreign and domestic policies, and question American sincerity on issues of nonproliferation, international law, and human rights for all peoples.”¹⁰ Said urged the US to take this into account when formulating policies and make every effort to pursue a balanced approach, especially when it came to the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. He had already been active for many years promoting peace within what he called the “Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict”¹¹ through op-eds in MEA and North American newspapers and through public and citizen diplomacy.¹² Professor Said stressed that the US needs to accept its share of responsibility in the conflict; given their multi-billion dollar economic and military aid to Israel and Egypt, “they are a party to it not merely an innocent bystander.”¹³ When then President George W. Bush said he wanted to “get the talks for peace going,” Said argued that “what is needed from the White House is more than talk. What is needed is a new action-oriented policy.”¹⁴ Said’s approach to the region was rooted in his paradigm of human rights and human dignity. He argued that “US officials need to make clear that support for Middle Eastern governments, including Israel, is contingent not on mere political and economic expedience, but on criteria such as civil and political as well as economic, social, and cultural human rights – especially cultural due process, protection of the human person and human dignity, and the promotion of authentic, participatory community.”¹⁵

Dr. Said also called out the “attitude of cultural triumphalism which filters Western perceptions of the Middle East.”¹⁶ In particular, he was concerned with the dominating perspective on Islam as alien and obtrusive, especially following the prominence of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis and Bernard Lewis’ “simplistic views” on Islam.¹⁷ With Nathan Funk, Said argues that “just as Islamic fundamentalism poses a threat to peace and security in the Middle East, so too does the tone of fundamentalism latent in Western cultural triumphalism.”¹⁸ He advised US policymakers to “act with humility, resisting the allures of self-congratulation and cultural triumphalism, and remaining open to learning and genuine multilateralism,” even as they pursue their leadership responsibilities.¹⁹ He also emphasized the importance of understanding local historical and cultural contexts, urging US policy in the region to “target some of the root causes of terrorism – exclusion, maldistribution of resources, absence of legitimate, and genuinely participatory political authority – rather than Islamic revivalism and fundamentalism.”²⁰ Indeed, Said wrote extensively on the need to understand the root causes of fundamentalism, and that they can be found within both religious and secular domains (see Religion and Conflict Resolution). Further, Said advocated for taking seriously the ethnic and sectarian differences within the Middle East.²¹ Responding to reports in 2003 about US-led regime change and transitional governance in Iraq, Said raised serious concerns about the potential for civil war. Considering the Kurdish community and other minority groups in the country, Said wrote that “any roadmap for peaceful transition in Iraq must take into account the multi-ethnic, multi-religious nature of Iraqi society. Iraqis and their American partners in liberation must commit themselves to establishing a system of governance and national identity rooted in the principle of pluralism.”²² In particular, “President Bush’s longstanding and publicly stated desire for democracy in Iraq necessitates a commitment to full cultural and political rights for all ethnic and religious communities in a future Iraq.”²³

Ultimately, Dr. Said promoted greater sensitivity among US officials to the local everyday experiences and needs of people in the region. Doing so would also improve America’s image in the region, allowing it to pursue policies that are more compatible with its long-term interests. He explained, “expressions of profound respect by U.S. officials for religious and cultural traditions might help in this capacity, especially recognition that real Islam is on the side of human dignity, and that Islam has an enviable tradition of cultural pluralism … The U.S. should make clear that it is interested in entering into dialogue with Islam, and that it does not view the religion of over one billion people as a ‘threat.’”²⁴ Said also urged US policymakers to support political participation structures aligned with people’s local culture and needs, rather than through the transplantation of Western models. “If peace is to come to the Middle East,” Said asserts, “it will not arrive solely through the instrumentalities of modern states … peace between peoples is the only lasting peace.”²⁵ Said advised that the US can best support democracy and development in the region by supporting its people “to develop democratic forms appropriate to their needs, rediscover life-affirming precepts of Islam, and develop structures that promise a cultural future for the people, not merely a technological future that negates their values.”²⁶

Drawing on his work on the role of Islam in regional politics as well as its peacemaking and human rights principles, Said asserts that the West needs to accept “the continued role of Islam in Islamic countries on its own terms, as a deeply embedded discourse.”²⁷ He argues that “the exclusion of the people of the Middle East from active participation in political life undermines stability in the region. The reconciliation between Islam and democracy is a crucial first step toward stable progress.”²⁸ In his prepared remarks for a 2002 working group meeting on the transition to democracy in Iraq, Said urged the US to consider local factors and facilitate the transition process by “empowering Iraqis to define what they want” rather than assuming a preexisting agenda. “While regime change can open the door to transition to democracy, the transition process will only succeed in the long run if it is an indigenous process – rooted in the active participation of a broad spectrum of Iraqis in the political process.”²⁹

Said’s call for a new US policy approach in the Middle East and North Africa continued with greater urgency following the events of 9/11, focusing in particular on building a “new story of American Islamic relations”³⁰ based on compatibility, complementarity, and coexistence across differences. He asserted that a continuation of policy that “focuses on symptoms and ignores underlying factors could easily reinforce the widespread despair, resentment, and powerlessness that has enabled [Osama] bin Laden to attract a following.”³¹ Professor Said instead calls for “a new chapter of cooperative relations” that does not ignore existing tensions but focuses on common ground between Western and Muslim cultures, allowing for a transcendence of “the most destructive idea in contemporary Islamic-Western relations: the idea that peace cannot be achieved so long as significant cultural differences persist”³² (see also Islam and Peacemaking and Islam and Politics). His contributions through his written analysis of policy as well as his ongoing public and citizen diplomacy exemplified that transcendence, as he remained steadfast in his commitment to building relationships of mutual respect and cultural coexistence both within and across the region.

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